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1
THE IMPACT OF ARMS PRODUCTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

1. Introduction

One of the most noted, though least studied, changes in the Third World in the last
years has been the salient increase in the production of armaments.

Public attention, as

witnessed in newspaper articles and public statements, has focused on the technological
and economic successes of some countries' military industries, such as Brazil and India
and, especially in the USA, the impact on US foreign policy.

Both certainly are

appropriate and interesting starting points, but they miss a large area in between:

the

impact of arms production in and on the countries that are conveniently, if crudely, put
under the heading of "Third World".

This then will be my focus:

the impact of arms

production on both the security and development problems of some countries in the Third
World. There are many partial aspects which are of relevance here: Military production
absorbs funds- and diverts them from other, civilian enterprises.
changes the cost structure
contribution.

Arms

of arms

production

also

procurement by allowing
influences

composition of a country's industrialization.
effects there are political ones.

On the other hand it

the

structural

a larger domestic
and

technological· ·

In addition to these and other economic

Some are domestic, for instance that a new political

pressure group. is created, consisting of the managers, workers, and owners of the arms
industries. Other, more important ones, are in the sphere of international relations: The
dependency upon suppliers of arms, in times of peace and in times of war, the foreign
policy maneuvering space, the credibility as a non-aligned nation, the status among the
hierarchy of nations in the world.
All these and other economic and political elements affect the security of peoples
and states in some countries in the Third World and, I may add, in the longer run also in
the first and second world.

Different social groups within the borders of a state are

affected differently, depending upon their status within the state and interests in the
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political and economic development of the state and so will be nations with different
preconditions for domestic arms production and different aims.
There are some general conclusions from international bodies, including leaders
and .intellectuals both from industrialized and Third World countries, that are worth
noting as starting points in this context. The dictum of the Independent Commission on
Development
Issues, commonly called the Brandt-Commission, called into operation by the
.
\

then World Bank President, Robert McNamara, that more weapons do not make mankind
safer but only poorer, 1 certainly rings true for the world as a whole, but does not do so
for all its parts, be they people within states or states themselves. Another international
commission, commonly - and since the death of its chairman also officially - called the
Palme-Commission, has extensively dwelled on the connections between common and
national security without being able to solve the puzzle. 2 But what the Palme-Commission
has done is to urge leaders in the world, including the leaders in the Third World, to
abstain from trying to increase national security at the cost of common security.

With

respect to the Third World, the Palme-Commission has proposed a strengthening of the
UN-security system and regional conferences on confidence building and disarmament, in
order to resolve existing problems and lower the present level of armaments. Yet another
international commission, though this time not of independent experts, but government
representatives, the UN-Expert Commission on Disarmament and Development, has put the
emphasis on the economic well-being of the poor in the Third World. 3 From a large body
of evidence these experts read that military efforts are in general harmful to economic
advancement.
These are then my three measurement rods for the impact of arms production in
the Third World:
How does it affeet the economic development of the countries that undertake it?
How is national security affected?
What about the security within regions and for the world as a whole?
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With these grand questions in mind I will still begin with much more petty things,
which are nevertheless necessary since they lay the ground for further discussion. I will
give a brief overview over the facts of arms production in the Third World, the countries,
technologies, aims, achievements and failures. I will then, in turn, discuss the economics
of arms production, and the national and international political aspects.

In the

concluding section, I will try to bring the various elements together again, but I have to
warn you that I have no better recipe for the mixing of the elements than the bodies of
eminent persons mentioned above.
2. An overview of arms production the Third World

Let us start with the beginning: The motive to set up arms production in a Third
World country. And indeed, this was universally the first step. There is no beginning of
arms production without the political will to do so. 4 Arms production does not generally
spring up as a consequence of an economic opportunity taken -by an industrial firm. This
is a first important observation: Arms production is a state controlled and state initiated
activity throughout the Third World. There seem to be some cases, like the Brazilian and
the Singaporean arms production, that do not fit this model, but in fact they do as I will
discuss a bit later. But what then are the statal motives to set up arms production? The
most common and persuasive one is to reduce dependence on an outside, unpredictable,
and often unreliable arms supplier.

The classical case fostering the decision to initiate

arms production is the threat of or actual working of an arms embargo. The expansion of
arms production in India for example was greatly supported by the arms embargo set into
effect by the United States and the United Kingdom against both India and Pakistan
during and after _their 1965 war.
arms industry started.

Incidently, the same embargo also got the Pakistani

Israel's arms production was helped in the same manner by the

French embargo of 1969 and Chile's arms industry was a result of the embargoes
conducted by many industrialized suppliers, including the West European countries and
the United States, after the coup of 1973. The list can be extended, i.e. with South Korea
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and Taiwan.

Their arms production efforts began in earnest when the United States

began playing the "China card", and of course South Africa, subject of an UN arms
embargo from 1963 and reiterated and made mandatory by the UN Security Council in
1977.
A second motive is related, though it transcends the first one.

Weapons are a

universal symbol of status in the presently largely unregulated, anarchic international
community of nations.

The production of weapons domestically gives more status than

the import of weapons from another country. This motive of showing the world what. one
can do, was a very pronounced one in some efforts, i.e. in the Argentinian weapon
programmes in the early 1950s, the Egyptian fighter programmes of the early 1960s and in
the programmes of the Shah of Iran in the 1970s.

It can also be seen in the current

Indian, Argentinian, and Brazilian naval programmes, where large ships are built at great
costs.

This motive, of course, is not only found in Third World countries, it is also an

important one in the industrialized countries. In Western Europe it currently is a question
of prestige for both the French, the German, and the British government to produce a new
fighter aircraft.

The eventual necessity to cooperate simply for cost reasons is long

buried under national pride of being among the few nations in the world able to produce
this ultimate symbol of sophistication in arms production.
Over time, not only in this case, but generally, economics gain in importance as the
driving force behind arms production, also in the Third World.

Production capacities,

once built up, have to be employed. Investments made have to repay. Arms production
can also l;>ecome an important earner of foreign exchange via exports.

As a motive for

setting up arms production, economic aspects have a dubious role. On the one hand, the
hope to save costs, especially foreign exchange costs, is almost universally present. On the
other hand, as will be shown in more detail in the next section, arms producti_on in the
Third World is only seldomly cost effective in the general sense, and the hope to save is
more often than not destroyed by the realities of high cost overruns.
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A fourth motive has to do with technology. While it sounds economic, it is really
more political than economic.

Arms production has been set up in some countries to

become the yeast of modern industries in the dough of backwardness. Arms production is
generally perceived to be on the forefront of technological development and there are
some historical

examples,

where

arms

production

was

instrumental

to

industrial

development, e.g. in Meiji Japan and in pre-revolutionary Russia. Whether this still is the
case, or whether not, as some authors have forcefully argued, nowadays arms production
is more a burden than a boost for industrial development, 5 is less important than the fact
that there are Third World decision makers, who are trying to use arms production in the
way described.

The most obvious example is the Brazilian one.

Arms production was

chosen by both Brazilian industrialists and the government in the late 1960s as one sector
which could lead on the path of industrialization via exports. The groundwork had been
laid by multinational companies producing a wide array of civilian goods.

Arms

production offered the advantage of legitimately being a state prerogative even in a very
liberal capitalist environment and of having a protected market in the Brazilian armed
forces.

Other countries trying similar approaches have been the ones in the ASEAN

region.
It should be clear, that these various motives push arms production into different

directions.
weapons.

Status can best be enhanced by highly sophisticated, technically demanding
These are expensive to produce in the typical Third World country and, since

they can only be produced in enclaves, the contribution of such projects to the civilian
industry will be negligible.

Where technology is the main issue, communality with

civilian production processes and civilian products has to be assured.

If independence

from arms suppliers counts most, then the emphasis will be on those parts of the arsenal
whose supply first becomes critical in crisis and war situations; that is ammunition and
spare parts. Such differences in approach can easily be seen in the production palettes of
the various arms producers. I will exemplify this soon.
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But arms production is not only shaped by the wishes of decision makers, rather
also by the capabilities of the domestic industry.

In fact, the industrial capability to

produce is the most important determinant of actual arms production in the Third World.
This has been- found in several empirical studies using statistical estimation techiques 6
and it can also been seen from a simple table (Table 1). All the important arms producers
in the Third World, like India, Israel, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and
North Korea also have diversified industrial sectors. Some of the states that would like to
build up arms production, and even have the financial means, like Libya and Syria, are
greatly hampered by the lack of industrial capacity.
In the case of Mexico, on the other end of the spectrum, a much larger level of
arms production would be expected from the figures on the civilian industry. In Mexico,
the political will to build up an arms industry has been lacking ·most of the time. There
were some attempts during the Echeverria presidency in the mid 1970s to build up an
aircraft industry, but activity has remained on a low level. This reinforces the argument
made earlier, that there is no arms_ production in the Third World without state
involvement. The importance of the industrial and technological base is also evident from
individual cases. Argentina's arms production program of the early 1950s faulted, despite
a comparatively advanced civilian industry and a good manpower base because ambitions
were too high.
The Brazilian efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s succeeded because the
ambition was much lower and much more adapted to the capabilities available at the time.
India again has been a case of over-ambition, where at several points in time the jump
from licensed prodµction to indigenous production was planned but failed.

Iran under

the Shah was a case of large investments when nothing much was available but money.
Large numbers of students were trained in the US and elsewhere, and much money was
spent on getting foreign companies to build up a military industrial infrastructure with
only limited success.

Table 1
Production of major weapons, value added in manufacturing
and military expenditures, shares in Third World total in % I
5-year- averages
Country

1982

19-70

Israel
India
Taiwan
Brazil
Argentina
South Korea
South Africa
North Korea
Egypt
Peru
Indonesia
c:tille
.Thailand
Singapore
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Mexico
Pakistan
Algeria
Morocco
Nigeria·
Colomb:i.a
Cuba
Syria
Malaysia
Venezuela
Iran,
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Oman
Libya·

(a)

(b)

(c)

( a)

(b)

(c)

23
46

( 3)
9
( 3)

8
10
3
6
3
2
·2
5
8
1
2
1

27
23

( 4)

4

7
(6)
18

5
3
2

4

5
4
3

2
3
2

1
11
5
2

1
1
1

16
8
2
( 3)
( 3)
2
2

1
2
1
1
2

<
2

<.

..;

<
<

12
1
1
1
1
1

<
1'

-.

-

1
3
2
1

<
<
<

1
1

<
<
1
4

1
1

9
9

7
7
6
6

2
2

1
1

<

<
<
<
<

·<
<

5
( 3)
( 3)
2
2

3
1
2
1

<

'·"'1

1

1
1

1
1
2

1.
1
1
1
2

<
2

2

2 ..

2

3
2

3

<

<
1
1
1
5

1

1
1
1

3
2

2
2

2

<

2

1
2
2
2
6

1

23

<
<
<

5
2
3

7; SIPRI Yearbook
Sources: World Development Report _ _1985, table
1978, 1986; SIPRI computer stored data base
(a)
(b)

(c)

<

Produe!tion of major weapons
Value added in manufactm::ing
Military expenditures
no value
smaller than .5
/✓----------~~_.,.,....-

~--.........c-~-- _.,.- - ~•--=-~•
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In addition to industrial base, the availability of funds is a limiting factor.
Another reason why Mexican arms production is not on a higher level is that the demand
of the Mexican armed forces is low.
substituted by arms exports.
weapons on a large scale.

To some extent, low domestic demand can be

The Brazilian success is largely based on the export of
In the early 1980s, more than 60 per cent of total arms

production was exported. Total amount of exports was more then 1 billion US-Dollars per
year. 7 Another successful arms exporter in the Third World is Israel, though the industry
is much less dependent on arms exports as is the Brazilian one. Other countries have tried
to follow suit.

While the ASEAN countries have been partly successful, others, like the

Argentinian and Chilean arms industry have spent millions of dollars in advertisements in
arms exhibitions and military journals all over the world without receiving many export
orders.

The arms market of the 1980s is not nearly the buoyant bazaar it was in the

1970s.

It has definitely turned into a buyers' market, where newcomers have great

difficulties to convince potential customers of the use value of their products.
Both industrial capacity and financial means are obviously relative to the level of
technological ambition.

Even the smallest among the countries in the Third World can

produce the simplest type of weapons. Thus, in the mid 1980s, 53 countries in the Third
World produced small caliber ammunition (Table 2).

Amunition production is so simple,

since machines can be bought in the industrial countries that form the metal also supplied
from the industrialized countries and fill in the powder that also can be bought from the
industrialized countries or produced as by-products in fertilizer plants. Small ships were
produced in 33 countries.

Again, the production of such a ship can be a rather simple

task and is not beyond the capabilities of even small Third World countries. On the other
end of the spectrum are the production of jet aircraft, artillery, missiles, helicopters, main
battle tanks and submarines.

Such weapons are only produced in a few Third World

countries, and also a few industrialized countries.

Qualitative Assessment of Arms Production in Third World Countries, mid-1980sa)

Table 2:

1/1

....
QI

-rl
1/1
1/1

~

Algeria
Argentina
Ranglade1h
Bolivia
Bruil
Burma
Cameroon
Chile
Colombia
Congo
Cuba
Dominican Republi,
Ecu~dor
Egypt
Ethiopia
G;;bon
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Homluru
Mong Kon&
India
Indonesia
Iran

Iraq

I

J

3

2
5

2
5
2

5

:2

5
'2

4

5

5_

5

5

5

4

4

3

5

5

5

5

5

5

3

...
5

J

5

4
4

3

5

5

5

3

5

5

5

5

5

J

4

3

5
5

5

5
3

5

2

3

5

,3

151

l2

(21
I2

151

121
5

5

5

3

5

3

2
2

I 21

3

2

I 21
5
5

121
2

2
5
5

5

3
5

2

,..

.,.

3

-121

5
3

5

''

4

141

1

5

5

I 41

ii

5

5

J.

I 41

3
3

::
3
3

..

I 21 •
121
3

4
5

14 I

3

5

f

.e .. .•
+-

,._

.

r.

.0

L

.;!

•

L

,,

4
1
4

Ii
(21

1•

1

5

3

3

2

.
u

4

i
L

."'
0

1
5

1
3

.-.

5 ··----···
4

4

4

4

(41

5

5
5
5
5
hracl
2
Ivory Coul
121'
Jordan ,
4
5
5
5
5
K~rea, North
5
5
5
5
5
Korea, South
2
Madaga'scar
3
4
5
Malaysia
5
4
3
4
5
2
Mexico
3
2
Morocco
2
Nepal
2
3
2
Nigeria
3
4
3
5
Pakistan
2
Panama
3
J
2
5
Peru
4
5
5
Philippinn
J
2
Saudi Arabia
2
2
Senegal
1
4
5
5
5
Singapore
5
4
5
5
5
South Africa
2
Sri Lanka
______ Sudan____
- 2c---------Syria
--~2---- ---•-•----- - ~ - - - - = - - - - Taiwan
5
5
5
5
5------

Thailand
Trinidad & Tobaeo
Tuni~ia

4

t.

4

J
4

5

•!i l
C

"

!i

t

,,
0

0
C

0,
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But even with respect to such weapon systems, differences can be made. It is for
example much easier to make a missile of 1960 vintage than to make one of 1980 vintage.
Thus, a Third World military industry may be able to produce a weapon system of older
vintage but not one of newer design. Here then is another usual decisi'on point for arms
production in the Third World, where the various motives behind it lead into differing
directions. The production of older weapon systems may be more cost effective, while it
will not enhance status very much and will not have great attraction for foreign
customers.
Often it is suggested that Third World arms producers start with simple, dated
designs and then increased their capability to produce more sophisticated and newer
weapon systems. While this certainly is a prudent way' to overcome starting difficulties,
this is no way to close the gap between arms production in Third World countries and in
the industrialized countries.

The technological level of arms production in the

industrialized. countries does not stand still, quite on the contrary: there is a constant and
sometimes rapid advance.

Instead of catching up with the developments in the

industrialized countries, an arms industry in the Third World, once set up, tends to lose
contact, since its internal dynamics are less than the ones in the industrialized countries.
This is an experience, that especially the Indian arms iJ1:dustry has rather
frequently made. In spite of large investments, the gap between the level of Indian arms
production and the level of arms production in comparable industrialized countries, say
Italy, has grown.

The Indians have repeatedly bought the newest available technology

and then tried to advance from there on their own. After a while, they found themselves
to be backward and bought the newest technology on the international market again.
Research and development in the industrialized countries - and spread on through the two
major alliances - is on a much higher level than military research and development in the
Third World countries. 8

The best qualified manpower, the best available resources and

large amounts of money are spent to develop newer and better weapon systems.

No
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country in the Third World is able to follow, let alone duplicate, this effort.
contrary:

On the

Money is often spent unproductively on reinventing things invented in the

industrialized countries earlier; and personnel qualified in Third World military industrial
firms leave the country to work in the industrialized countries where more money and
better research facilities are offered.
Among the Third World countries it is only Israel that has been able to break
through the technological barrier and to generate a dynamic in the arms industry that
even surpasses the one in many industrial countries. The most important reason for this
breakthrough is the close relationship with the Untted States both in financial,
technological, political, and manpower terms.

Still, it is notable, that the Israeli arms

industry has reached such a high technological level, that currently even the United States
are buying some electronics and remotely piloted vehicles from the Israeli arms industry.
Let me at this point after having made some_ general remarks about the facts of
arms production in the Third World turn to individual countries.
Israel has by far the most advanced arms industry among Third World countries.
There was some production of armaments already in the late 1940s and 1950s but the scale
was low.

The expansion came in the second half of the 1960s and during the 1970s.

Much of the technology used in the Israeli arms industry is of foreign origin; mostly
French until the end of the 1960s when the French government under de Gaulle declared
an arms embargo; and from the U.S.A. after that. But the Israeli arms industry is capable
of adapting foreign designs for its own needs and nowadays it is not technology as such
that is imported, but rather components, like electronic gadgets, engines, automotive parts,
etc. that are then put together for products like the Kfir fighter aircraft, the Gabriel
missile and the Merkava tank. The Israeli arms industry is under strong pressure to put
out usable products, since the chances that they might be used soon are high.

Still, the

Israeli industry has been very optimistic about its technological capabilities and has
promised to produce products which are superior to the ones of Western industrialized
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countries.

Currently, the Lavi fighter aircraft is the main witness of this ambition.

Initially, though, 60 per cent of the parts for the Lavi have to be imported, and the
finance is almost totally from the

us. 9

The Third World country with the largest arms industry is by far India, employing
more than 250,000 people.
similar total.

The West-German arms industry, for comparison, employs a

The roots of Indian arms production go back to ordnance factories

established by the British and then run by the Indian armed forces after independence.
The great expansion came in the early 1960s, in parallel to the expansion of military
expenditures after the 1962 war with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan. Licenses to
produce major weapons were bought both in the East and the West, excepting the United
States.

There have constantly· been efforts to develop sophisticated Indian weapons;

efforts that have mostly been frustrated. In order not to lose the edge in the competition
with Pakistan, license production projects were started when domestic designs did not
prove successful.

There is now, in the mid-to-end 1980s a mixture of actual large scale

production of Soviet, West German, British and French weapons under license and large
scale development efforts of an Indian tank, an Indian helicopter, and an Indian light
fighter aircraft.
Taiwan is one of the least known arms producers among the Third World countries.
The government which tightly controls the sector is not interested in much publicity
\

about it. The production of aircraft, vehicles and ships was quietly built up during the
1970s with US, Israeli and some South Korean help.

The emphasis is on ships and less

sophisticated ordnance and aircraft.
While Taiwanese arms producers have tried to stay under cover as much as
possible, the Brazilian arms producers have tried to receive as much public attention as
possible.

Brazil represents, as mentioned earlier, the first case of export-led military

industrialization. Central sectors are the production of armoured vehicles and aircraft in
private or semi-private companies under state control. They need to export to survive and
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got the orders after their products had been tested under rough conditions in the Middl<::
East in the 1970s.

The technical approach is based on using what is available; that is

components like engines, automotive parts, electronics and special metals, mostly produced
by multinational companies in Brazil.

The use of such components also· facilitates

maintenance and repair in foreign countries, since multinational companies like MercedesBenz, Saab or Cadillac have civilian subsidiaries in many countries. There is one area of
arms production in Brazil, though, that is completely different. Naval production is done
in military-run arsenals; and there are hardly any efforts to export. The Navy has not
cooperated in the joint armed forces/private industry drive for military industrialization
and demands more sophisticated weapons that can only be produced with much foreign
support. Recently the Air Force and Army also changed their approaches somewhat and
currently weapon systems on a much higher technological level are under construction in
Brazil, like the Osorio main battle tank and the AM-X figher aircraft (a joint production
program between Brazil and Italy).
The Argentinian arms industry was the most advanced among the Third World
industries in the 1940s and 1950s, building tanks and jet fighter aircraft. At the time, the
government under Juan Peron had great ambitions to surpass Western Europe in
industrialization.

Arms production was to be the showcase for this import substitution

industrialization.

Technological expertise came mostly from German ex-Wehrmacht

engineers who had gone in great numbers to Argentina to avoid presumed prosecution.
When Peron was overthrown in 1955, the military government also abandoned most of the
arms production projects, since arms production had come to be identified with Peronist
politics.

An exception was only made by the Air Force, which is traditionally very

nationalist minded.

A second beginning was made during the early 1970s, when Peron

again was in power and this time not abandoned but rather greatly expanded by the
military junta that overthrew the elected government in 1976.

Focus was naval

construction via importation of sophisticated designs for corvettes and submarines from
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West Germany.

When military expenditures were decreased by the civilian government

coming to power in 1983, arms production entered a pig crisis. Export efforts have been
largely frustrated.

The civilian government is heavily subsidizing overcapacity in arms

production in order to avoid more unemployment.
The situation in South Korea equals in many respects the one in Taiwan except that
arms production was initiated a decade earlier.

The state tried to involve private

industry by giving rather favourable financial conditions to those companies entering
arms production.

According to persistent rumors, this way political favours to the

government could be repaid. Technology has mostly .come from the US. One speciality of
the South Korean arms industry is the reverse engineering of US weapons technology. US
re-engineered artillery and ammunition has been sold widely in the Third World including
Iran in the early 1980s.
South Africa's advance in arms production was made possible by the interpretation

of the 1963 arms embargo against the country chosen by a number of major suppliers of
weapons in Western Europe, especially France and Italy to exclude transfer of arms
production technology. The South African government used these loopholes and built up
an arms industry based on licenses from these suppliers. Later licenses were also acqµired
from Israel.

The South African arms industry chose to produce what was imminently

needed: first weapons that might be used in a guerilla-war, like light armoured vehicles
and small counterinsurgency aircraft, and later, when the Portuguese colonies had become
free, weapons against regular armies, like fighter aircraft, warships and· small tanks.
They adapted the technologies imported for their purpose but, because of the lacking
industrial base, had to import many components. The 1977 mandatory UN arms embargo
did not totally limit the flow of components South Africa's military still needed, like
engines, electronic parts and computers.

By the mid-1980s, when most industrialized

countries had also stopped the supply of these items, the 20-year South African effort to
become independent in arms production had resulted in an arms industry that could
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produce a wide range of components and weapons.
design, though.

Almost all of these are of 1950s'

The weak-point of the South African arms industry is technological

advance. For a number of years, the South African military did not seem to worry much
about this matter, since it was mostly concerned to get sufficient weapons to counter
armies also armed with less sophisticated weapons.

From the early 1980s, though, the

armed forces began to demand more sophisticated weapons and less of the weapons the
South African industry can produce. By the mid 1980s a number of improved designs of
old weapons, like fighter aircraft, helicopters and surface ships had been developed, but
they all do not represent real advances in sophistication.
North Korea's arms industry was built up in the 1950s with the help of Soviet

technicians. The emphasis was on small ships and artillery. The North Korean industrial
planning of the 1950s gave special emphasis to arms production.

In that decade North

Korea was, after Argentina, the most important arms producer in the Third World. The
range of weapons produced has not changed much since then, despite some attempts to
produce modern tanks and fighter aircraft.

Reportedly though, the problems were so

great, that at least the production of fighter aircraft was stopped. Korea's arms industry
has remained large, but has concentrated on the production of less sophisticated weapons
of Soviet design.
Egypt's production of weapons is quantitatively smaller than

North Korea's, but

qualitiatively it is of higher standing. The history of arms production in Egypt has been
full of changes.
domination.

It dated back into the last century, before the time of British

In the 1960s, under Nasser, there was an overly ambitious program to

produce fighter aircraft and long range missiles.

Technical advice mostly came from

Germans (some of them had been in Argentina earlier), but when West European countries
stopped the influx of components, the projects had to be abandoned. At the same time, a
domestic small arms and ammunition industry producing Soviet designed weapons was
built up.

That industry is stilf functioning and putting out weapons that are mostly
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exported.

In the 1970s, after the break with the Soviet Union, the grandiose project of

the Arab Organization for Industrialization was set up in Egypt, to be financed by Saudi
Arabia and some other Arab countries.

The AOI faltered after the Camp David

agreement in 1977. Egypt continued with some of the projects that had been drawn up
with US and West European help but had to abandon most bacause of lack of finance.
Still, there was extensive assembly and license production of aircraft, vehicles and
missiles in Egypt in the early 1980s, some of it for Iraq, financed by the conservative
Arab countries, thereby emulating the earlier AOI set-up, without a formal agreement.
After Egypt a number of countries are listed in Table 1, in which there is more
limited arms production, either in quantity or quality. In Peru, e.g. there was some na',:al
ship building activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Indonesia there is a booming
aircraft producer within the state sector manufacturing helicopters and transport aircraft
produced under license from FR Germany, France and Spain. In Chile, a major activity is
the production of armoured vehicles under Swiss license and from domestic designs.
There also is limited production of ordnance and aircraft copied from US models. Most
of the Chilean activity started in the late 70s. In Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and
Malaysia, arms production had been rather limited until the late 1970s when some projects

were started with assistance from West European countries. In Singapore, there also is a
strong presence of foreign arms producers. Singapore is one of the few countries in the
world which allows multinational companies to flourish in the arms sector, but tight
control is exercised via the Sheng-Li group of companies which is owned by the Ministry
of Defence.
Third World.

Pakistan's ordnance factories are among the larger arms producers in the

They combine a number of factories run by the military producing

everything from clothing to small arms, ammunition and small aircraft under Swedish
license. There are many more countries, in which arms production occurs, but in all of
them it is a minor, relatively insignificant activity.
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3. The Economic Impact of Third World Arms Production

Under this heading I will discuss mainly two aspects:
The costs of arms productions and the civilian-military economic interaction, that
is the spin-off from arms production into the civilian sector, as well as the spin-in of
civilian advancements into the military indu_stries.
The cost to produce a weapon system can be divided into several parts; the costs
for research and development, the costs for tooling up the production line, the costs of
training employees, the costs of preproducts and the labour costs. Some of these costs are
more or less fixed, independent of the length of production-run, i.e. the research and
development costs, the training costs and, to some extent, the tooling costs. They decrease
per unit with the number of systems produced. In addition there is the aspect of learning ·
to coordinate production better over time w~ich reduces the unit cost with the number of
i terns produced.
Some of these fixed costs are dependent upon the national technological and
industrial environment in which they occur. Research and development costs will be the
higher the lower the general level of science and technology is and the less experience
there is with prior military research and development projects.
when less skilled labour is available.

Training is more costly

Tooling up is more expensive with less prior

experience in doing so.
The advantages of both length of production run and technological environment
generally

militate

against

arms

production

in

Third

World

countries.

Military

expenditures are smaller, there is less prior experience and a smaller advanced civilian
industrial sector, if there is one at all.

The one factor that works into the opposite

direction, namely to make arms production less costly, is the direct labour costs.
production

in Third

World

countries

can

only

be

cheaper

than

Arms

production

in

industrialized countries if the share of labour costs in total costs is high. Weapons with a
high share of labour input are e.g. ship construction, and some types of small arms
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production.

Generally though, arms production is not very labour intensive; and the

required craftsmanship tends to be highly paid in Third World countries as well as in
industrialized countries.
While not much detailed cost data are available, many statements by officials in
arms industry, and the data we have, witness to the correctness of these considerations.
The costs of F5-aircraft produced in Spain, South Korea and Taiwan were all higher than
the production costs in the United States. 10 In successive South African White Papers it
had to be explained to the public why it was important to increase arms production
despite the high cost.

In one particular case, the cost of producing a communication

device in South Africa was nine times the cost ·of the similar item on the world market. 11
One important way to cut costs is to produce weapons under license. The costs of
a license are always much below the costs of original. research and development.
Newcomers on the arms export market, like the FR Germany in the 1960s, Italy, Austria
and Israel in the 1970s, have tried to enter the arms market by offering production
licenses where the traditional suppliers like the United States and the Soviet Union were
not willing to do so. In the contracting arms market of the 1980s all suppliers except the
United States and the Soviet Union have become more willing to sell production licenses
in arms deals, if the customer so requires. And it is not only easy to get licenses, they are
also rather cheap, since in most supplier countries the original research and development
was financed by the respective state and exporting companies have no costs to recuperate through the export of know-how. But even for the license production projects where we
have cost information, production unit cost regularly seem to be higher than unit costs of
the same weapon produced in the originating country.

This is because of the high

component, tooling and training costs in small series. Examples are the Italian Lupo-class
frigates produced in Peru, French Mirage fighter aircraft produced in South Africa, and
(

the Soviet MiG-21 aircraft produced in India. The premium can vary from a few per cent
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in the case of the Indian MiGs to several hundred per cents under less favourable
conditions.
Simple cost calculations give an indication of the higher cost of domestic arms
production with which Third World countries have to deal. But they do not give the full
picture.
Total cost may not be a decisive criterion - that may rather be foreign exchange
cost. In many countries the availability of freely convertible funds is the real bottleneck,
not capital or labour cost. If it is possible to incur a good part of the total costs in local
currency, an arms production project may be worthwhile even if total costs are higher
than the international market prices. Most of the labour costs are normally spent locally,
though it is not unusual that specialists from industrialized countries have to be invited
to aid in the production process. Tooling and training costs can be in domestic currency
if there is a domestic machine tool industry of high standards and if there are skilled
nationals available to train others.

But this is the exception in Third World countries.

The same applies to preproducts: if there is a broad industrial base, chances are good that
foreign exchange costs can be cut.

The Brazilian approach, for example, is based upon

the use of domestically produced preproducts.

It is therefore not surprising that the

Brazilian arms industry seems to have been an important foreign exchange earner from
the mid 1970s. But Brazil has remained the great exception to the general rule.
If, then, arms production is more costly than imports of weapon systems, either the
numbers procured by a Third World armed forces have to be reduced, or military
expenditures have to be higher than they would be without domestic arms production.
Tax and levy payers have to subsidize the domestic arms industry, either now, or if
production is credit financed now, later.

If the burden of state expenditure on the

economy is increased, then chances for economic development are decreased.
This last point is not undisputed.

The economic calculus of arms production in

many countries seems to work out to the contrary, namely that arms production is a motor
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of industrial development giving impetus and mqmentum to civilian advances. Investment
in arms production therefore often is not viewed as unproductive, but rather possibly
more productive than investment in civilian economic activities.
The idea that the military sector is a pull on industrialization was first developed
by the German historian Werner Sombart, who at the beginning of this century singled
out demand by the armed forces in Western European countries in the 15th and 16th
century as the most important force in the creation of capitalism. 12

While his

explanation never reached the, popularity of Marx' theory or Max Weber's protestant ethic
proposition, the idea that Sombart developed at great length is part of the understanding
of many decision makers and academics both in the industrialized countries and the Third
World. The academic discussion on whether production for the military helps or hampers
economic development has raged on at least since the American historian John Nef
published a devastating critique of Sombart's theses in the 1940s. 13

The debate is

currently stimulated by the US American SDI program and its consequences for the
economic relations among industrialized countries on the one hand and Soviet efforts to
use military advancements more productively in the civilian industry on the other hand.
While much less research has been done with respect to Third World countries there
are some relevant conclusions on the relation between arms producdon and the civilian
sector which seem to be fairly well_established.
One such conclusion. is that technological advance in the military industry can spill

over but that it is far from always the case. The conditions have to be favourable. The
distance between the military and the civilian, in geography, institutionally and in the
technological level may not be too great. This of course means, that arms production in
Third World countries bears more potential for the civilian industry, if it is shaped in
accorda_nce with the available industrial and technological resources. The South African
and the Brazilian approaches of producing simple weapons in great numbers are obviously
more suited to such requirements than the Indian or Argentinian approach of producing
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highly sophisticated weapons in small numbers.

A broad base of civilian industries can

only profit from domestic arms production, if requirements and specifications of the arms
industry can actually be met and components do

not have to be imported from foreign

countries.
The mentioned favourable conditions for spin-off from arms production to the
civilian sector are generally not present in the Third World. The situation gets worse, if
the level of ambition in the arms production sector is high and industrial capacities are
low.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from empirical studies of the military-

civilian economic link is that civilian investment is crowded out by military investment
both on the supply and the financial side.

Good scientists and engineers can only be

employed either in the civilian or in the military sectors and chances are that many of
the best ones will work in the military sector.

In fact, what can _be seen in many

countries with fairly good educational institutions is that technicians and engineers
trained for civilian purposes are drawn into the military sector including arms
production.
A third conclusion to be drawn is that investment in military production will
generally stimulate the civilian economy less than investment in civilian production
simply for the fact that the first aim of military production is not to increase productive
activity or to advance- the level of technology as such but rather to come up with weapon
systems. Spill-over will always be a by-product which, if the military sector is very large
and circumstances are very beneficial, may be very important.

But nevertheless they

remain a by-product, while in the civilian sector productivity and return on investment
are the foremost performance criteria.
As the amount of spin-off is greatest if civilian and military pr'oduction sector are
shaped in accordance with each other, decision makers in the Third World have been
tempted to model the civilian sector so that as much of the arms production technology as

20

possible is exploited.

Governments in Israel, South Africa, Argentina, South Korea and

other countries have been under pressure not only to subsidize arms production directly
but also to subsidize an advanced civilian industry in sectors relevant for arms
production.

In cases where arms production is an important economic activity, as in

Israel, India, South Africa and Argentina, the arms production sector in effect becomes
the core of the industry; from where the dynamic is expected to come, where the level of
technological ambition is set and much money is spent. An interesting case in point was
Iran during the 1970s. The Shah's ambition to build up a large, modern arms production
complex encompassed not only the arms production sector proper but entailed the build-up
of a long string of other industrial projects from chemical factories to machine building
industries. The technological level of these supportive industries had to be on the same
level as that of the arms industry in order to use as much forward and backward linkages
between them as possible.

This meant, though, that the gap to the rest of the economy

became enormous, and that there were few possibilities for interaction.
consequence was the creation of a dual economy.

The economic

The political consequence was the

exclusion of a large part of the population from advances in the economic sector - which
turned out to be more detrimental for the regime than the direct economic consequences
in the long run.
The Iranian example was an extreme one. In no other country has the leadership
been able to finance such a gigantic effort of creating a modern industry geared to the
needs of the arms industry.

But the structural dilemmas are the same anywhere in the

Third World where arms production occurs.

Wherever arms production is done at the

level of the existing civilian industry, sophisticated weapons cannot be pi:oduced.

If

modern weapons -are to be produced more than just an arms industry has to be financed.
The latter approach affects the pattern of industrialization.

The requirements of arms

production influence a good part of the industry and dominate governmental industry
policy.

Some sectors become highly advanced while others are neglected.

A dual or
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heterogeneous economy develops.
sector are limited.

Backward and forward linkages within the civilian

The chain of mutual stimulation, which is probably the most

important precondition of comprehensive industrialization is broken. While growth rates
of industrialization may be high since the modern sector might be expanding, the effect
on employment and the betterment of economic conditions for many people will be
negative.

While one should not overemphasize the importance of arms production in

skewing industrialization processes, arms production, where important and not adapted to
local capabilities, contributes to an industrial development which is not beneficial in the
long run.
4. The national politics of arms production

As was pointed out earlier, the main motive of arms production in the Third World
is increase in independence from a single or several suppliers of weapons.
production in fact decrease this kind of vulnerability?

Does arms

The evidence we have on this

point is not sufficient to make definite judgments, but some conclusions can be inf erred
from as diverse cases as Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Iran in the early 1980s.
A first distinction has to be made with respect to time.

While short term

dependence on suppliers of arms, ammunition and spare parts can be rather easily
decreased through arms production, it is as we have seen, very difficult to decrease the
longer term dependence on the inflow of know-how and technology.
South Africa, for example has achieved almost total independence from foreign suppliers in servicing, maintaining and supporting the weapon systems the armed forces
have in their arsenals. In the case of outright war, South Africa would be able to keep its
forces going for a long time.

Part of the issue of short term independence is the

capability to quickly adjust to and adapt new types of weapon systems.

South African

and Israeli engineers have shown this capability with respect to captured Soviet designed
weapons. So have, to the surprise of many observers, Iranian engineers in the early 1980s.
The Iranian arms production factories have also shown tQ be able to sustain a war effort
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at least in some production areas. Argentina's air force was able to keep its domestically
produced Pucara-aircraft in the air during the Falkland/Malvinas war while for foreign
aircraft, such as French Mirages and US-American Skyhawks, great supply problems arose.
Obviously, short term supply dependence will be lower the fewer components and
preproducts have to be imported.

If a decrease of short term supply dependence is the

aim of arms production, then it makes sense for decision makers to invest as much as
possible in a broad and comprehensive civilian support industry - even if costs are raised.
further and if a large part of the domestic civilian industry has to be shaped according to
the needs of the military industry.

Such an approach was for instance chosen in South

Africa. Where short run supply dependence is hardly an issue, as in the Brazilian case, it
can accepted that most preproducts come from multinational companies. Short run supply
dependence can also be accepted in Israel, where the close connection with the USA
constitutes mutual leverage, giving Israel some insurance that the USA is drawn into any
serious conflict Israel is participating in.
In order to decrease the long run dependence on technology inflow, which, given
the dynamic of military innovation in the industrialized countries, is not decreasing but
rather increasing, Third World countries either have to substantially scale down their
technological ambitions or try to finance large research and development programmes of
their own. The first alternative has, as has been said earlier, accepted for instance by the
South African military and also in Brazil with its completely different approach. But in
both cases the pressure to change to the second alternative mounts.

The military in the

two countries, as well as the military elsewhere in the Third World demands the most
modern weapons available and is not content with the technology of yesteryear or suitable
for export customers that are technologically even less advanced.

But the second

alternative has so far only proven possible for Israel for the mentioned reasons.

Others

that have tried this way have failed, even a country with such a large educational base
and such a large arms industry as India:
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But how important is this issue of dependence? Probably, its real importance has
decreased. The arms trade has become a highly competitive business, with a multitude of
suppliers and not a few from the Third World, which are eager to supply even in the most
astonishing circumstances. As is, for instance, shown by the supplies to Iran in the early
1980s, even for an outcast of the international system it is possible to get supplies of
weapons and spare parts in large quantities from large number of suppliers. 14 There have
hardly been any efforts to put an arms embargo on the participants of the Iraq-Iran war.
Twenty years ~go, during the Indian-Pakistani war, the Near Eastern wars and the Biafra
war in Africa, arms embargoes were the rule.

Nowadays the only embargo which is in

force is the one against South Africa and it is difficult to see that the large number of
suppliers in the West, The East, and the S,outh will agree on another one.

True, the

number of suppliers of arms production technology is smaller than the number of
suppliers of weapon systems.

These are mainly the industrialized countries of Western

Europe, since the United States and the Soviet Union are reluctant to share military
production technology. But first, the Western European countries are among the ones least
willing to agree on arms restraints or embargoes, and secondly, the transfer of military
technology is very difficult to control.

When the West German submarine building

company H D W supplied the plans to produce submarines in South Africa, not more than
a few bags full of microfiches were physically transferred. 15

It was only due to the

insisting efforts of the company to get a political go-ahead for the delivery of components
that the whole deal became known.
The issue of dependence on arms supply has become - for most countries in the
Third World - more a symbolic than a real issue.

In the current international system,

dependence on the supply of arms is judged by many decision makers as more important
than, for example, the dependence on the supply of foodstuffs, which may be a more
severe threat to national sovereignty in case of crises.
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Independence from foreign supply also has an important domestic propagandistic
use in many Third World countries. Even in cases, where the arms industry is far from
being able to supply the armed forces comprehensively from its own production lines, it is
often claimed, that one is self-sufficient.

Examples are the Indian case, where self-

sufficiency has been regularly claimed in government reports since the late 1960s and
Chile, where self-sufficiency also is a claim since the end of the 1970s.
attitudes are supported and given credibility by these claims.

Nationalistic

Since nationalism is an

important ingredient in legitimacy of both civilian and military governments in many
countries in the Third World, regimes are supported through these claims and the
activities to underline them.
The backside of this nationalism can be aggressiveness towards other states. There
are tensions between and within states in many regions of the Third World. The tendency
to use nationalistic attitudes as an important ingredient to regime legitimacy increases the
danger that domestic crisis is carried over the borders in the form of war.

While arms

production is not the major cause of nationalism in many Third World countries - those
rather have their roots in the history of colonialism, economic backwardness into our time
and

cultural subordination of the people and the leaders of the Third World - it

contributes to the militarization of nationalist feeling. A case in point is the Argentinian
invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, that was stipulated by economic and political
crisis at home and made possible both by extensive arms imports and a booming domestic
arms production industry.
Since this section is to be about national security, something has to be said about
those that determine what is to be understood by this te.rm. The impact of domestic arms
production on national security is judged differently by various existing social and
political forces. Let us consider the most vocal of them.
First to be named are the armed forces.
production

has

generally

been

affirmative,

but

Their judgment on domestic ar'ms
with

important

exceptions.

As
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professional soldiers, their main worry should be to field a military force as capable of
preventing interference with national borders as possible.

It is not at all obvious that

such a consideration leads to the support of a local arms industry.

As has been shown

above, domestic arms production is often more costly than arms imports and one
consequence may be that not the newest weapon systems are procured. On the other hand,
increased short term supply independence is an important argument in favour of
production of at least ammunition and spare parts. But in the real world, armed forces
are not only acting as professional soldiers. They have in many cases taken over political
rule and expanded their roles to include the furthering of economic growth. Soldiers as
rulers have most often been strongly in favour of arms

production, practically

independent of their general political orientation. Reform oriented military governments
like the Argentinian ones of the 1930s and 1940s or the Nigerian one of the late 1970s
were strong supporters of building up arms industries as motors of industrial development.
This approach was not only compatible with ideological persuasions that the military had
to take a lead in overcoming encrusted structures, but was also immediately practical, as
the military could control and steer the arms production sector best.

More restorative

military governments like the Brazilian one that took power in 1964 or the Chilean one
after 1973, while in general favouring free enterprise in trying to cut down government
subsidies, have behaved equally favourable to arms production, also seeing it as a
strategic economic sector to make their imprint on the economy. An important side effect
has always been that military personnel and retired officers were given jobs and
income. 16

The objections by economic planners of liberal economic persuasion that there

was a contradiction were, for instance in Argentina in the late 1970s, brushed aside. The
military's position was sometimes different in cases of interservice rivalries and where a
civilian government toppled by the military had strongly supported arms production as
was the case in Argentina after the coup in 1955.

26

Until the 1960s, arms production had almost exclusively occurred in military-run
arsenals.

There was hardly any involvement of private companies at least in the final

production stage.
changed.

But with the expansion of arms production in the 1960s, the pattern

Private industry became involved, first in Israel, South Africa and Brazil and

later in other countries, too.

Here the military planners interested in building up arms

industries found partners in private industry that wanted to enter arms production. The
industrialists, of course, mainly saw the profits to be made, but they also hoped to get
technological advances financed that might later be of value in civilian business.

The

willingness of the military authorities to share production with private industry stemmed
both from the general liberal economic approach that became predominant in many
countries in the 60s - not least through the activities of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund - and because it secured the support of another political
force in favour of arms production.

The incorporation of national industrialists also

strengthened the nationalist image of arms production. Multinational companies had by
definition to be excluded from such activities.

Nowadays the involvement of state

arsenals in arms production has become more the exception than the rule. Such arsenals
are for instance run by the Brazilian Navy, the Pakistani Army and countries with a
socialist orientation such as Burma and North Korea.

Many state arsenals or state

companies were turned into commercial enterprises in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance in
Indonesia, Argentina and Peru.

In a typical move, the South African state owned

ARMSCOR concern appointed an industrialist, the former chairman of Barlow-Rand, as
its vice chairman in 1979. The state has generally kept control, but has tried to involve
domestic industry to a larger degree.
This way, civilian industry, though potentially hurt by less civilian investment has
only seldomly voiced opposition against arms production projects, and where, more
because of excesses than because of principal considerations.

In South Africa, private

industry in the late 1970s complained about the unproductivity of the arms industry that
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would steal away labour and profits from the civilian industry. In Argentina, at the same
time, civilian industry balked at the privileges of the arms industry while its subsidiaries
were cut.

In Israel some sectors of the civilian industry are concerned about the

inflationary effects of the large arms industry and have voiced opposition to some of the
big arms industrial projects like the Lavi fighter aircraft.
Another group that has been known in cases to voice opposition against arms
production projects are economic planners. If they have been economic liberals, the special
treatment necessary to let the arms industry survive, violated their textbook models of a
free economy, like in Brazil in the 1970s, in Argentina during the late 1970s and Nigeria
after the end of military rule and the establishment of a liberal civilian government in
1979.

Other economic planners, for instance in India since the 1960s, or in Argentina

since the end of military rule in 1982 have been concerned with the extra costs of arms
production at the expense of civilian programmes. The ranks of those opposing local arms
production for financial reasons have been swelled since the late 1970s by advisors from
international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund - more by chance
than by will.

Their demands to cut government expenditures have in many cases

decreased the funds available for arms industries.
There is then, in summary, no clear-cut case for increased national security
through domestic arms production. What is enhanced is the perception of greater foreign
policy maneuvering space especially through military action.

Arms production, as the

focal point of various elite group interests, widens political support for a nationalist
foreign policy. The impact on real military capacity is more limited. In cases, where no
arms embargo is realistic, domestic arms production may even lead to a decrease in
military capabilities through higher costs of procurement and detrimental effects on the
economy.
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5. Arms production and international security

The international system of nations has witnessed major changes since the early
1960s when it was greatly expanded in numbers.

Probably the most important of these

changes has been the relative decrease in power experienced by the great powers, first of
all the United States.

It is not the place here to discuss whether the bipolar world has

changed into a multipolar one, but it cannot be overlooked that the maneuvering space of
the Third World as a whole with respect to the great powers has increased.

This trend

was most visible in the early 1970s and has since then only been partly reversed.
With few exceptions Third World governments have sought greater independence
from and less influence by the great powers. They have long despised foreign economic .
exploitation, political domination and cultural estrangement. The countries of the Third
World have tried to change a number of world orders; to move up in hierarchies; or to
change structures.

Propagandistic efforts focused on the. international economic order.

This was not only because analyses from various schools of thought lead to the Qonclusion
that a new economic international order is at the heart of a changed world but also
because the vulnerability of industrialized countries on the supply of some raw materials,
especially oil, seemed to make such a move possible from the late 1960s.

Third world

efforts to introduce a new international economic order, for instance through the
establishment of international raw material funds have largely failed. This failure should
not detract attention from the fact that even if raw material funds had been established
and other measures demanded by the Third World in the early 1970s taken, the economic
structure of the world market would not have substantially changed. The industrialized
countries are the main exporters of raw materials and would have benefited from raw
material regimes, as well as Third World countries would have had to pay for them.17
At the same time that the attempts to create a new international economic order
failed, real changes have occurred in the military sphere, the world military order. The
share of military expenditures by Third World countries has increased from less than 15
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per cent in the late 1960s to more than 25 per cent in the early 1980s.

Only the large

increase in military expenditures by the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s has
reversed the trend that military expenditures in Third World countries were growing
faster than military expenditures in the industrialized countries.

While, as in the

economic sector, much of the increased share of the Third World cannot be taken to
represent real increases, since much money was spent wHhout gaining much in military
capability, the Third World as a group and especially some countries within it have
enhanced their position vis-a-vis industrialized countries.

Nowadays great powers

have

great difficulties in dominating militarily even rather small Third World countries, e.g.,
French experiences in Chad or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Only real ministates like
Grenada are really easy to overtake. Of course, there has been some reaction by the great
powers. The United States has created the Rapid Deployment Force and then the Central
Command, the Soviet Union has increased its airlifting capabilities, France has created
the Force d'Action Rapide and Italy and the United Kingdom are also organizing
intervention forces.
Arms production the Third World has brought in a new structuring element within
the world military order. Weapons as the primary ordering category are increasingly not
only transferred from the North to the South, but also produced in the South.

While,

given the remaining dependence on the delivery of components and technology, the
change has been less profound than it might seem from the numbers alone, in the
perception of many Third World leaders, there is now something like a new world
military order, in which Third World military sectors are not dominated as much as they
were before. Of course, given its close relation to industrial capabilities, arms production
has also contributed to the differentiation process within the Third World.

Only some

countries are capable of pursuing arms production in earnest and have done so. Because
of its special technological dynamics, it should not be expected that the number of
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important arms producing countries will increase much beyond what we have now - rather
some will it find hard to keep current status.
This new military order has not been a more peaceful one than the old one. The
number of wars in the Third World has not decreased. 18

Quite to the contrary there

have never been more wars going on in Third World countries than at the moment. ~ome
of them like the Iran-Iraq war or the India-Pakistan confrontation are wars for regional
domination. But the majority are internal wars, where a. well equipped domestic army is
fighting against some guerrilla force.

One element of the new military order is that

Third World guerrilla forces' chances of winning wars have decreased.
While up to now a less hierarchical world military order has not proved to be a
more peaceful one, there is no necessity for it to work this way.

For quite some time,

Third World countries have not been interested in arms control or disarmament, arguing
that the superiority of industrialized countries made it their obligation to disarm first.
While the argument remains true, its importance has declined with the increase of Third
World armaments.

The chances for regional arms control or disarmament should be

increased.
Unfortunately, this reasoning does not show in reality. One of the reasons is that
the anarchic international system does not favour any such regional attempts at arms
control and disarmament. It favours the individual struggle of nations against each other.
Another is that, as argued before, nationalistic attitudes within Third World countries
have gained in importance in conjunction with the build up of military sectors.

The

situation is different, where the political approach is different, as for instance in some
Latin American countries. The re-democratization of Argentina and Peru has resulted in
some overtures to overcome the further militarization of the respective societies. 19
Arms production in Third World countries is not the moving force behind changes
in the international system, but it is an important instrument and symbol. As such, arms
production is not necessarily a .positive or negative element in the creation of a safer
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world.

It both raises the possibility to make the world more peaceful through regional

cooperation, arms control and disarmament, but it can also result in more armed conflicts
and more insecurity for the world. So far, the later has been the rule.
6. The security choices of arms production
In arms production in Third World countries, some observers and decision makers
have been tempted to see a happy marriage between two often competing state functions:
the

provision

of

weapons

to

enhance

national

security and

the

furthering

of

industrialization for economic development. My analysis leads me to a much less positive
assessment. Arms production does not in general diminish the contradiction between the
resource use for military purposes and for development, in fact, in most cases this
contradiction is increased or given a specific twist. This is the result of the high costs of
arms production, its pull and push effects that can also shape civilian industry towards
the production on high levels of technology, often ill adapted to advancements of the
economy.
Arms production can be a net positive contribution to both the enhancement of
military capabilities and the economy, if production is focused on weapons easy to
produce. Some countries have chosen this way, but it is mostly countries which are under
some direct threat, such as South Africa, Taiwan and North Korea. In most cases, arms
production is not really designed to contribute to either of the two goals, but rather is, as
are many weapon imports, the expression of the attempt by Third World leaders to
enhance their status and position in the international system of nations. The suggestion to
produce less sophisticated weapons has fared as badly as the suggestion to Third World
leaders to build military forces which are not based on doctrines inherited from the
industrialized countries, but on doctrines emphasizing what Third World's countries have
in abundance - that is manpower. 20
The inhabitants of the industrialized world could sit back and neglect these
predictably fruitless, or rather - from the point of view of enhancing development -
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counterproductive, attempts of Third World leaders to change their status. In fact, that is
what is largely happening - see as an example the industrialized countries behavior
towards the Iraq-Iran war: the superpowers have marked the limits of their interests and
respect them; they and many other industrialized countries have made good prof its; and
initiatives to stop the fighting are sparse.
That arms production is so aggressively pushed in many Third World countries
despite its problems and negative consequences should not come as a great surprise. The
current structure of international relations, both in its economic and military spheres
greatly support such behavior. We find it in the industrialized countries as well as in the
Third World.

Historical analysis gives us the insight that economically disadvantaged

states often have tried to compensate through militarization. The chances, though, to go
on from militarization to economic growth are bad; much worse than they were in the
past.
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